Published 02-10-2024
Abstract
Speaking about the third wave of democratisation, two decades ago, Larry
Diamond (2002) noted «the unprecedented growth in the number of regimes
that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian». After
Diamond’s work, the literature investigating an halt or even a reversal in the democratisation
processes after the early 1990s has also grown rapidly (Jenne and
Mudde 2012; Kornai 2015). During the 1990s and 2000s, Hungary was perceived
as an example of successful democratisation in Central Europe for almost
two decades. Between 2010 and 2022, however, the premiership of Victor
Orban radically changed this perception and the country became an example
of populism, illiberalism and a drift towards authoritarian government. It is not
only Hungary’s turnaround that is perceived as surprising by democratisation
scholars, but also – and above all – the solidity of the changes brought about by
the Orban regime. Indeed, the speed, degree and scope of the changes realised
during the FIDESZ leader’s tenure affected all three dimensions of politics,
polity and policy. Taking the framework of competitive authoritarianism (CAR)
from S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, this study aims to test its applicability to contemporary
Hungary (2010-2022). In this perspective, the case of the regime
instituted by V. Orban represents a useful element of verification of the literature
on the categorisation of hybrid regimes, and in particular of competitive
authoritarianisms. The expected results of this research highlight the need to
revive the debate on regime change and the necessary recognition of the autonomy
gained by this particular type of regime, which can no longer be described
as ‘transitory’. Furthermore, in the conclusions, Orban’s Hungary will be proposed
as a key to interpreting the recent transformations that the processes of
democratisation (and the processes of autocratization) are undergoing.